Unique Aspects of Veterans LawsBenefit of the DoubtBenefit of the Doubt

4.1. Benefit of the Doubt

Pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.102, any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the appellant "[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter."  "The Secretary shall consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case before the Secretary with respect to benefits under laws administered by the Secretary.  When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant."  38 U.S.C. § 5107(b).


"When after careful consideration of all procurable and assembled data, a reasonable doubt arises regarding the degree of disability such doubt will be resolved in favor of the claimant."  38 C.F.R. § 4.3.  Section 3.102 defines the term "reasonable doubt" as used in § 4.3 as doubt "which exists because of an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence which does not satisfactorily prove or disprove the claim."  38 C.F.R. § 3.102; see Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that section 3.102 "restates" the provisions of 38 U.S.C. section 5107(b) (benefit of the doubt) in terms of "reasonable doubt").  Thus where the Board concludes that the evidence is not in equipoise, specific consideration of section 4.3 is not warranted.  See Schoolman v. West, 12 Vet. App. 307, 311 (1999) (explaining that where the preponderance of the evidence is against an appellant's claims, "the benefit of the doubt doctrine does not apply").  Mayhue v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 273, 282 (2011).


Perhaps the analogy most helpful to an understanding of the "benefit of the doubt" rule is that the standard is similar to the rule deeply embedded in sandlot baseball folklore that "the tie goes to the runner."  If the ball clearly beats the runner, he is out and the rule has no application; if the runner clearly beats the ball, he is safe and, again, the rule has no application; if, however, the play is close, then the runner is called safe by operation of the rule that "the tie goes to the runner."  Similarly, if a fair preponderance of the evidence is against a veteran's claim, it will be denied and the "benefit of the doubt" rule has no application; if the veteran establishes a claim by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the claim will be granted and, again, the rule has no application; if, however, the play is close, i.e., "there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence," the veteran prevails by operation of 38 U.S.C. section 5107(b).  Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55-56 (1990).


The Court has held that the failure of the BVA to apply the benefit of the doubt rule or to set forth clearly its reasons for not applying it constitutes error.  See O'Hare v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 365, 367 (1991); Sussex v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 526, 529 (1991).  In addition, the Court notes that 38 U.S.C. 1154(b) provides specifically that the Secretary "shall resolve every reasonable doubt in favor of the veteran."  38 C.F.R. § 3.302.  Furthermore, when the BVA can cite no evidence or facts by which to impeach or contradict a claim, there is no justifiable basis upon which to deny application of the doctrine under 38 C.F.R. § 3.102.  Sheets v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 512, 516-17 (1992).

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